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1. Introduction
1.1. Motivation
Economists have long been concerned with the ecient allocation of resources in an
economy with public goods. At least since Samuelson (1954) it has been an issue
central to modern analytical Economics.
The problem is, of course, simple to state. Because of their non-rival and non-
excludable characteristics, consumers have an incentive to under-bid for the public
goods. In a competitive environment, the price of public goods will therefore be
below their marginal social value. In the absence of Government intervention or other
corrective mechanisms, this in turn will generate an ineciently low, under-supply of
public goods.
The study of mechanisms (games) that elicit sucient information about agents'
preferences and other relevant data in the economy so that an ecient level of pro-
vision of public goods can be ensured is not a new venture by any stretch of the
imagination.1 This paper is a contribution to the study of such implementation
mechanisms.
We study a continuous2 and balanced3 mechanism that is capable of implementing
in Nash equilibrium all the Pareto-ecient individually rational allocations in an
economy with public goods. The Government has a large degree of choice in our
set-up. It can choose a set of weights (Lindahl prices) that correspond to the share
of public expenditure that each agent has to pay. The mechanism we present then
ensures that initial endowments are re-allocated so that the chosen vector of weights
is indeed a vector of (constrained) equilibrium Lindahl prices, and implements the
corresponding Lindahl equilibrium allocation.
In the mechanism that we analyze, by its choice of Lindahl prices, the Government
is able directly to control the distribution of welfare in the economy. We do not
1The relevant literature is truly vast, and we do not even try to survey it anywhere in this paper.
We devote Subsection 1.2 below to an attempt to t the present paper into the previous, directly
related, literature of which we are aware.
2In the obvious sense that the outcome that it generates is a continuous function, except at the
boundary, of the actions of the participants.
3In the obvious sense that the Government's budget is always balanced, both in and out of
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model the process that leads the Government to its choice of Lindahl prices. Since
all Pareto-ecient individually rational allocations are implementable in our model,
the choice of Lindahl prices becomes a purely distributional problem. The use of the
mechanism we propose would open the way for a benevolent Government to attempt
to aggregate social preferences over the distribution of welfare to guide its choice of
Lindahl prices. In particular a variety of voting mechanisms could yield outcomes
that are deemed desirable according to predened criteria. In other words, a system
of `scal democracy' could be used to make the distributional choice. The mechanism
that we analyze below is then able to deliver the corresponding ecient allocation of
resources in the economy.
1.2. Related Literature
As we mentioned in Subsection 1.1, it would be foolish to even attempt a survey
of the literature on the optimal provision of public goods.4 What follows is just an
attempt to t the present paper into the literature concerned with mechanisms that
implement an ecient allocation of resources in the presence of public goods. Even
this particular strand of literature is too vast to make a proper review viable.5 We
simply refer to those papers of which we are aware, and that are directly related to
the present one.
The rst attempts to construct a mechanism that decentralizes an ecient allo-
cation of resources in an economy with public goods can be traced back to at least
Clarke (1971), Groves and Ledyard (1977), and Groves and Ledyard (1980). These
papers proposed mechanisms that guarantee an ecient allocation of resources in an
economy with public goods and in which `truthful revelation' is a dominant strategy
for every participant.
Laont and Maskin (1980) provide a cornerstone that changed the focus of all sub-
sequent contributions. They show that the quest for a dominant strategy mechanism
as, for instance, in Groves and Ledyard (1977) is an impossible goal. In particu-
lar, they demonstrate that (even restricting attention to quasi-linear preferences) it
4As a starting point for an overview of the literature on public goods, we refer the reader to
Green and Laont (1979) and Laont (1982) and the references therein.
5Laont and Maskin (1982) provide an overview of the literature on incentives. Their paper
surveys much of the literature we are referring to indirectly here.Efficient Provision of Public Goods 3
is impossible to design a mechanism that will implement an ecient allocation of
resources in an economy with public goods that is also balanced in the sense that
the Government budget is always balanced, both in and out of equilibrium. Thus,
if we take the issue of the (game-theoretic) `credibility' of the mechanism seriously,
we are restricted to mechanisms that implement Pareto-ecient allocations in Nash
equilibrium whenever we are unwilling to restrict attention to some narrow class of
preferences.6
Hurwicz (1979b) and Hurwicz (1979a) characterize the set of allocations that are
implementable in Nash equilibrium and present a mechanism that implements in
Nash equilibrium the Lindahl equilibria of an economy with public goods. Postle-
waite and Wettstein (1989) and Tian (1989) shift the focus of attention to continuous
mechanisms that respectively implement in Nash equilibrium the Walrasian and Lin-
dahl correspondences. In particular Tian (1989) presents a continuous and balanced
mechanism that implements the Lindahl correspondence in an economy with public
goods. The emphasis on continuity can be traced to a dissatisfaction with previ-
ous mechanisms that were deemed too complex to be viewed as practically `playable
games'
This paper proceeds one step further. We present a continuous and balanced
mechanism in which the Government is in eect able to choose the Lindahl prices
(the shares of total public expenditure to be paid by each individual in the economy)
and implements the corresponding Pareto-ecient allocation in Nash equilibrium.
Thus, the Government is able to choose which point on the Pareto-ecient frontier of
the economy it wants to implement. This is clearly not possible using a mechanism
that simply implements the Lindahl correspondence as in Tian (1989) since in general
the set of equilibrium Lindahl prices corresponding to a given vector of initial endow-
ments is nite. The redistribution of endowments necessary to reach all (individually
rational) Pareto-ecient allocations is endogenous in our mechanism.
1.3. Overview
The material in the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe formally
the set of economies with public goods to which our results apply. In Section 3 we set
6See for instance Holmstr om (1979).Efficient Provision of Public Goods 4
up the machinery that allows us to dene the individually rational Lindahl equilibria
for the economy, and we prove some of the basic properties of Lindahl equilibria. In
Section 4 we describe informally the structure of our proposed mechanism for the
ecient provision of public goods. In Section 5 we describe formally the proposed
mechanism, and we state our main results. For ease of exposition, the proofs of all
remarks, propositions and theorems are relegated to the Appendix. In the numbering
of equations, propositions, and other objects a prex of `A' indicates that the relevant
item is to be found in the Appendix.
2. The Model: One Private and One Public Good
We consider an economy with one private consumption good (c) and one public
consumption good (G). The economy consists of a nite number, H, of individuals
who are indexed by a superscript h = 1;:::;H. The set of individuals in the economy
is denoted by H = f1;:::;Hg. Each individual has preferences over the non-negative
orthant IR
2
+ | the possible non-negative private good-public good pairs. Individual
h's preferences are represented by the utility function Uh(;).
Assumption 1: The number of agents H in the economy is at least three.
Assumption 2: Each individual's utility function is continuous, strictly increasing
in both arguments and strictly quasi-concave7 over the consumption set IR
2
+.
Assumption 3: Each individual h is endowed with a strictly positive amount, !h,
of the private good. The initial endowment of public good in the economy is zero.
The vector (!1;:::;!H) is denoted by !.
Assumption 4: The production technology that transforms the private good c into
the public good G is linear. Without loss of generality, we can therefore take it to be
the case that the available technology transforms one unit of c into one unit of G.
7Both strict monotonicity and strict quasi-concavity are stronger assumptions than needed. All
our results hold in the case of preferences exhibiting quasi-concavity and local non-satiation. Obvi-
ously, the analysis is greatly simplied in the present formulation.Efficient Provision of Public Goods 5
An economy, consisting of an assignment of private good endowments ! >> 0 and
utility functions, is denoted by E(!). The total amount of resources available in the
economy is denoted by R =
PH
h=1 !h. Given a set of individuals H and an assignment
of utility functions the set of all E(!) with ! >> 0 and given total resources R is
denoted by E.
In a completely standard way, we dene an allocation of resources to be an ar-
ray of non-negative numbers C = fc1;:::;ch;:::;Gg specifying the amount of private
consumption for each individual and the amount of public consumption in the econ-
omy. Obviously, given Assumption 4, an allocation C is feasible if and only if G =
R  
PH
h=1 ch.
The set of Pareto-ecient allocations is also completely straightforward to dene.
An allocation C is Pareto-ecient if and only if it is feasible and there exists no
other feasible allocation C0 such that Uh(ch0;G0)  Uh(ch;G) for every h 2 H, and
Uh(ch0;G0) > Uh(ch;G) for some h 2 H. The set of Pareto-ecient allocations is
denoted by P.
We are interested in economies in which it is optimal to provide a strictly positive
amount of the public good and in which it is not optimal to transform the entire
aggregate endowment into public good.
Assumption 5: Every Pareto-ecient allocation contains an amount of public good
G which is strictly positive and strictly below R. In other words, for every C 2 P we
have that 0 < G < R.
Our focus will be on those allocations that are both Pareto-ecient and that do
not force any individual below the utility level that he could achieve by opting out of
the economy altogether.
Definition 1: Given !, an allocation C is said to be individually rational if and only
if Uh(ch;G)  Uh(!h;0) for every h 2 H. The set of individually rational allocations
given ! is denoted by I(!).Efficient Provision of Public Goods 6
3. Lindahl Equilibria
We start by dening the set of Lindahl equilibria for the economy. We nd it con-
venient to work with a minor variation of the standard denition of (constrained)
Lindahl equilibrium. We will comment on the dierences between our way of set-
ting up the equilibrium concept and the standard one after we have given the formal
denitions below.
Throughout the paper, we denote the H   1-dimensional simplex by H 1 =
f(x1;:::;xH) 2 IR
H
+ such that
PH
h=1 xh = 1g. The interior of H 1 will be denoted
by b H 1.
In essence, we consider a situation in which each individual h proposes to add a
certain amount ^ T h to the total amount of public good (and hence total taxes paid)
in the economy. The total tax burden is then shared according to a vector of weights
 = (1;:::;H) 2 H 1. Each individual maximizes utility, given the declarations
^ T  h = f^ T igi6=h of all other individuals in the economy, and the vector of weights .
Let a vector ^ T = f^ T 1;:::; ^ T Hg be given and, for every h 2 H, consider the
following problem
max
ch;Th Uh(ch;Gh)
s:t: Gh = T h +
P
i6=h ^ T i
ch + hGh  !h
ch + Gh  R
ch  0 Gh  0
(1)
By Assumption 2, and by inspection of the constraints, for every  2 H 1, and
every ^ T 2 IR
H, a solution to Problem (1), exists unique for every h 2 H. Moreover,
it is immediate to check that the values of ch and Gh that solve Problem (1) do not
depend on the vector ^ T  h. Let ^ T h(h;!h; ^ T  h) and ch(h;!h) be the solution to
Problem (1), and Gh(h;!h) be the corresponding value of Gh obtained from the rst
constraint.Efficient Provision of Public Goods 7
Definition 2: A Lindahl equilibrium is a vector  2 H 1 such that, for some
vector ^ T = (^ T 1;:::; ^ T H), we have that ^ T h = ^ T h(h;!h; ^ T  h) for every h 2 H.
Notice that if  is a Lindahl equilibrium, by denition we have that for every
h 2 H, (i) Gh(;!) =
PH
i=1 ^ T i  0, and (ii) ch(h;!h) = !h   h PH
i=1 ^ T i.
Throughout the rest of the paper, the set of Lindahl equilibria of an economy
E(!) is denoted by T[E(!)]. Moreover, given a Lindahl equilibrium  2 T[E(!)], the
corresponding allocation will be denoted by C(;!) = [c1(;!); :::; cH(!); G(;!)],
while the set of all Lindahl equilibrium allocations for an economy E(!) will be
denoted by L[E(!)].
Definition 3: The set of Lindahl equilibrium allocations for economies in E is de-
noted by L. In other words an allocation C is in L if and only if C 2 L[E(!)] for some
E(!) 2 E.
The following Proposition states that the equivalent of the First and Second Wel-
fare Theorems hold in our model. Every Lindahl equilibrium allocation is Pareto-
ecient, and every Pareto-ecient allocation is a Lindahl equilibrium allocation for
some redistribution of initial endowments. Except for the fact that our denition
of Lindahl equilibrium is a minor modication of the more common one, this is a
standard result.8
Proposition 1: Under Assumptions 1 to 5, the set of all possible Lindahl equilib-
rium allocations and the set of Pareto-ecient allocations coincide. In other words
L = P
Our last preliminary characterization of Lindahl, equilibria is the following. We
want to show that every  2 b H 1 is a Lindahl equilibrium for some redistribution
of initial endowments. Formally, we have
Proposition 2: Under Assumptions 1 to 5, for every  2 b H 1 there exists E(!)
2 E such that  is a Lindahl equilibrium for E(!).
8See, for instance, Tian (1988).Efficient Provision of Public Goods 8
Throughout the rest of the paper we adopt the following notational conventions.
Given any  2 H 1, we let 
() denote the set of (redistributed) endowment vectors
that guarantee that  is a Lindahl equilibrium of the economy. A typical element of

() will be denoted by ! = (!1();:::; !H()). The corresponding set of Lindahl
equilibrium allocations will be denoted by (). A typical element of () will be
denoted by C() = (c1();:::; cH(), G()).
Definition 4: Somewhat abusing terminology, for the remainder of the paper, we
say that a vector of tax loadings  2 H 1 is individually rational (given !) if and
only if there exists an allocation C() 2 () that is individually rational according
to Denition 1 above.
Given a  2 H 1 and !, we denote by (;!) the set of allocations which are
in () and which are individually rational according to Denition 1 above. In other
words, we set (;!) = () \ I(!).
Remark 1: Notice that the set of individually rational vectors of tax loadings may
or may not coincide with the interior of the simplex b H 1. For instance, if every
individual's preferences are such that Uh(ch;G) > Uh(x;0) and Uh(ch;G) > Uh(0;x)
for all ch > 0, G > 0 and x > 0, then all vectors  2 b H 1 are individually rational
according to Denition 4.9
We conclude this Section with a brief discussion of the denition of Lindahl equi-
librium that we use in this paper, compared to the standard text-book way of pro-
ceeding.
There are two dierences between Denition 2 and the standard text-book deni-
tion of a Lindahl equilibrium. The rst is entirely immaterial. We ask each individual
to choose a ch and a T h and then set Gh = T h +
P
i6=h ^ T i. The denition of equi-
librium (Denition 2) then ensures that Gh is the same across all individuals. The
standard way of proceeding would be to ask each individual to choose a ch and a level
of overall public expenditure Gh subject to the constraint that ch + hGh  !h, and
then to require that in equilibrium the choice of Gh is the same across individuals.
9For instance, this would clearly be the case if all agents have preferences of the Cobb-Douglas
type.Efficient Provision of Public Goods 9
This is clearly immaterial. As we remarked above, the levels of private and public
consumption chosen by each individual in Problem (1) do not in fact depend on the
vector ^ T  h.
The second dierence between Denition 2 and the standard one is the presence of
the third constraint in Problem (1). Notice that if we dened a Lindahl equilibrium
without imposing the third constraint in Problem (1) we would clearly obtain a set
that is weakly contained in the set T[E(!)]. However, from Remark 1 we know that
the equilibria that may be added in this way all have Pareto-ecient allocations.
Since our focus is on implementing the Pareto-ecient allocations of resources for the
economy, this does not weaken our results in any way.
This second modication of the concept of Lindahl equilibrium roughly corre-
sponds | modulo the fact that we ask each individual to declare a separate ^ T h | to
considering what is known as a `constrained' Lindahl equilibrium.10
4. Decentralizing Lindahl Equilibria
Consider a Lindahl equilibrium . Clearly, if the Government could somehow work
out the vector of tax loadings , the equilibrium allocation is decentralizable in the
following sense. Once  is announced, each individual in the economy announces a
tax amount ^ T h taking the announcements ^ T  h of other individuals as given, and so as
to maximize utility, knowing that the Government will set G =
PH
h=1 ^ T h, and the tax
payable by each individual equal to hG. In other words, given a vector  which is a
Lindahl equilibrium, the individuals in the economy can be viewed as playing a game
in which they each choose their own ^ T h, which, by Proposition 1, is guaranteed to
yield a Pareto-ecient allocation of resources in the economy as a Nash equilibrium
outcome.
As is well known (Tian 1989, Hurwicz, Maskin, and Postlewaite 1995, among
others) it is indeed possible to design a mechanism that will implement the Lindahl
correspondence. That is, it is possible to design a mechanism that, given a vector of
endowments will have as a Nash equilibrium the corresponding Lindahl equilibrium
allocation(s). Thus, in terms of our simplied description of the problem above, it
10See for instance Hurwicz (1986) or Tian (1988).Efficient Provision of Public Goods 10
is possible to construct a mechanism that will induce the agents to reveal enough
about their preferences and endowments so as to allow the Government to set the
appropriate vector of Lindahl prices.
Our point of departure from the existing results on the implementation of the Lin-
dahl correspondence is the following observation. In general, for given endowments,
the set of Lindahl equilibrium allocations is nite. In eect, this means that using a
mechanism that implements the Lindahl correspondence as above, the Government
can ensure eciency, but has no control over which point on the Pareto-frontier is
actually implemented. It can ensure eciency, but it has no control over the distri-
bution of welfare.11 However, in view of Propositions 1 and 2 above, it is clear that if
the Government could somehow choose the vector of Lindahl prices it would indeed
regain control of the distribution of welfare. It is also evident that, in order to be
able to choose the Lindahl prices at will, the scheme proposed by the Government
must endogenize the process of redistribution of initial endowments.
Suppose that the Government were to pick an arbitrary vector  and then asked
the individuals in the economy to play the game described informally above. Then,
unless by uke  is a transformed Lindahl equilibrium, it is not hard to show that
the game may not have a Nash equilibrium. Therefore, far from decentralizing a
Pareto-ecient allocation of resources, the game that we have sketched out may have
an ill-dened outcome.
The scheme for the decentralized ecient provision of public goods which we ana-
lyze below revolves on the following key observation. Proposition 2 above guarantees
that any  is a Lindahl equilibrium for some redistribution of initial endowments.
Suppose then that, together with the tax declarations ^ T h, the individuals were asked
to declare a vector of lump-sum transfers which redistributes the endowments in the
economy. Suppose moreover that, given any arbitrary , we could construct the re-
distribution part of the game in such a way that in equilibrium, after endowments
are redistributed,  is indeed a Lindahl equilibrium. Then we would have achieved
two important goals. First of all we would have a decentralized way to implement the
11The set () of Lindahl equilibrium allocations corresponding to a given  is typically a nite
set. If the public good is a normal good for every individual in the economy, it is trivial to show
that to any vector  there corresponds a unique equilibrium allocation. In other words, in this case,
() contains only allocation for every possible .Efficient Provision of Public Goods 11
ecient allocation of resources associated with the Lindahl equilibrium . In other
words, the Government could announce an arbitrary (individually rational) vector of
tax loadings , and be assured that in equilibrium endowments would be redistributed
so as to make  a Lindahl equilibrium, and that the associated ecient allocation of
resources would result.
The second objective which a scheme as above would fulll is the following. Recall
that by Remark 1 we know that as  varies in H 1 the set of Lindahl equilibrium
allocations spans the entire set of Pareto-ecient allocations. Therefore, announcing
dierent vectors of tax loadings  the Government now has at its disposal a way
to decentralize any ecient and individually rational allocation of resources in the
economy.
In the remainder of the paper, we develop rigorously a scheme for the decentralized
ecient provision of public goods along the lines we have just described intuitively.
Besides the two properties we have just described, the proposed scheme has the chief
virtues of being continuous and balanced. In our view, in practical terms, we believe
it could be described as a playable game. The latter claim, although clearly vague
in some way, will be substantiated in Subsection 5.1 below in where we describe the
basic scheme. In short, we believe that the game we propose is simple and easy to
interpret from the part of the players; each agent only has to declare an amount of
desired increase in the amount of public good, and a vector of redistributive transfers
of initial endowments (across other agents).
5. A Scheme for the Efficient Provision of Public Goods
5.1. The Scheme
The description of the general scheme which we propose is as follows. Each agent h
is asked to call a number, ^ T h, and a vector ^ bh. The components of ^ bh are denoted
by ^ bh
1;:::;^ bh
H, so that, formally ^ bh is an H-dimensional vector of real numbers.12 The
square matrix [^ b1;:::;^ bH] obtained from the H (column) vectors ^ bh is denoted by ^ B,
while the (column) vector (^ T 1;:::; ^ T H) is denoted by ^ T. Each vector ^ bh is restricted
12As is clear from (2) below, each ^ bh in fact lives in a subset of IR
H 1. We consider these vectors
to be elements of IR
H with the restrictions (2) purely to simplify notation.Efficient Provision of Public Goods 12
to satisfy
^ b
h
h  0 and
H X
i=1
^ b
h
i = 0 (2)
We denote by Ah the set of all possible declarations by h. In other words Ah is
the set of all (^ T h;^ bh) 2 IR
H+1 which satisfy (2).
The Government xes a vector of weights  = (1;:::; H) 2 H 1. Given the
pair (^ T; ^ B), the taxes, transfers, and the amount of public good in the economy are
then determined as follows. Let
T
h = 
h
H X
i=1
^ T
i (3)
and13
B
h =
H X
i=1
^ b
i
h (4)
The consumption of individual h is then given by
c
h(; ^ T; ^ B) = !
h   T
h   B
h (5)
Since the Government's budget is, by assumption, always balanced, we can then
compute the amount of public good as follows. Using (3), (4), (5), and the restrictions
(2), we have
G(; ^ T; ^ B) = R  
H X
h=1
c
h(; ^ T; ^ B) =
H X
h=1
T
h =
H X
h=1
^ T
h (6)
Throughout the rest of the paper, we let C(; ^ T; ^ B) denote the allocation of resources
yielded by (3), (4), (5) and (6), given  and the array of declarations (^ T; ^ B). In other
words, we set,
C(; ^ T; ^ B) = (c
1(; ^ T; ^ B);:::;c
H(; ^ T; ^ B);G(; ^ T; ^ B)) (7)
13Notice that, because of (2), we immediately have that
PH
h=1 Bh = 0.Efficient Provision of Public Goods 13
5.2. Feasibility of Allocations Under the Scheme
By inspection of (3), (4), (5) and (6) it is straightforward to check that, in our
proposed scheme, given the actions of others, each individual has the correct incen-
tives to implement a Pareto-ecient allocation of resources. This is because, roughly
speaking, the individuals' maximization problems in our scheme coincide with those
associated with the Lindahl equilibrium .
However, we know that an arbitrary  is a Lindahl equilibrium only for some
redistribution of private endowments in the economy. Therefore, the rst thing we
need to check about the proposed scheme is that in principle it is in fact able to deliver
all possible re-allocations of initial endowments. This is indeed the case because of the
large number of degrees of freedom we have built into the scheme via the redistribution
declarations ^ B. The next remark tells us that any redistribution of initial endowments
can in principle be delivered by our scheme.
Remark 2: Let a vector of initial endowments ! be given. Then, for any other
vector of endowments ! such that
PH
i=1 !h =
PH
i=1 !h, there exist declarations ^ B
satisfying (2) and ^ bh
h = 0 for all h, and such that !h   Bh = !h, for every h 2 H.
5.3. Bankruptcy and Negative Public Goods
There is one diculty with our proposed general scheme which we have not dealt
with yet. It is very easy to explain what the problem is. By inspection of (3), (4), (5)
and (6), it is immediate that for some vectors of declarations it is possible that some
(or all) agents may be bankrupt (ch < 0), and/or that the scheme yields a negative
value for14 G.
In order to deal with this diculty, we `augment' our proposed scheme as embodied
in (3), (4), (5) and (6) so that even when an array of declarations (^ T; ^ B), yields
bankruptcy and/or negative public goods, the actual outcome of the scheme yields
well dened payos to all agents.
There are three ways to pursue this objective. The rst is to adjust the values
of private consumption and of public good so that they are forced to remain non-
negative. The second is to include in the scheme an extra declaration that induces the
14Clearly, it is not possible that all agents be bankrupt and that G  0 at the same time.Efficient Provision of Public Goods 14
agents truthfully to reveal their endowments. The third is to give each of the agents
something like a veto vote when the proposed allocation makes them bankrupt. We
pursue all three possibilities in turn.
The rst of the two possibilities above corresponds to the case of a partially in-
formed Government, namely a Government that knows the agents' endowments. The
second and third ways to solve the bankruptcy and/or negative public goods corre-
sponds to the case of an uninformed Government, namely a Government that has no
information about agents' endowments.
5.4. Ecient Provision of Public Goods With a Partially Informed Government
To work towards our rst result, we start by dening the sets declarations ^ T and ^ B
which guarantee that all agents consume non-negative amounts of both the private
and of the public good. Given  2 H 1, dene the set F() to be as follows
(
(^ T; ^ B) 2 A j R >
H X
h=1
^ T
h  0 and !
h  
H X
i=1
^ b
i
h   
h
H X
i=1
^ T
i  0 8h
)
(8)
Whenever ^ T and ^ B are not in the set F(), we proceed to zero out the declarations:
we set the consumption of each agent to be equal to his endowment of private good,
and G to be equal to 0.
More formally, consider the following outcome map O : A ! IR
H+1
+ that, for any
given  2 H 1, associates an allocation C to every possible array of declarations
^ T; ^ B 2 A. Let C0 be the allocation (!1;:::;!H;0). We then dene
O(; ^ T; ^ B) =
8
<
:
C(; ^ T; ^ B) if (^ T; ^ B) 2 F()
C0 otherwise
(9)
Throughout the rest of the paper, for every h 2 H, we denote by Oh(; ^ T; ^ B) the
private and public good consumption for individual h in the allocation O(; ^ T; ^ B).
This gives us all the ingredients to describe formally our augmented scheme.
Remark 3: Given a  2 H 1 consider an augmented scheme dened as follows. For
every array of declarations (^ T; ^ B) 2 A, the resulting allocation is given by O(; ^ T; ^ B).Efficient Provision of Public Goods 15
The augmented scheme which we have just described, yields a well dened H-
player strategic-form game which we will denote by  (). The strategy set of each
player h in  () is Ah. Player h's payo given any strategy prole in A is given by
his utility from consumption of private and public good Uh[Oh(; ^ T; ^ B)].
For the remainder of the paper, for a given  (), by the set of Nash equilibrium
outcomes of  () we mean the set of private consumption and public good allocations
that result from any Nash equilibrium of the strategic-form game.
We are now ready to state formally our rst main result.
Theorem 1: Let any vector of tax loadings  2 b H 1 and ! be given. Assume that
 is individually rational according to Denition 4.
Then the set of Nash equilibrium outcomes of  () is (;!).
The intuition behind Theorem 1 above is not dicult to outline. It can be divided
into three distinct steps. First of all, it can be shown that any Nash equilibrium of
 () must be in the set F() as dened in (8). To see that this must be the case, notice
that because of (2) either the amount of redistribution is zero for every h, or there
must be some individual h that in fact gains from the redistribution part of the game
(Bh < 0). If the strategy prole (^ T; ^ B) is outside F(), this particular individual will
always want to deviate and push the system back in F(). He will be able to do so
because, using the fact that Bh < 0, he can make sure that all other individuals face
non-degenerate budget sets, while still keeping some of the redistribution in his favor
given by Bh.
Once we know that any Nash equilibrium of  () is in F() we can proceed as
follows. To show that every Lindahl equilibrium must be a Nash equilibrium of  ()
we use Proposition 2. This tells us that for some redistribution of endowments, the
given  is in fact a Lindahl equilibrium of the economy. It is then clear that if we take
an array ^ B that redistributes endowments in just the right way, together with the
array ^ T that yields precisely the amount of G in the Lindahl equilibrium, we must
have a Nash equilibrium of  ().
Lastly, to show that every Nash equilibrium of  () is a Lindahl equilibrium of
the economy for the appropriate redistribution of endowments we make the followingEfficient Provision of Public Goods 16
observation. Some fairly straightforward computations show that the opportunity set
(in terms of (ch;Gh) pairs) that each individual faces in  (), given ^ B h is the same as
the opportunity set he faces in Problem (1) if we give him an initial endowment equal
to !h   Bh. It then follows that, if no individual has a protable deviation in  (),
the array (^ T h; ^ Bh) must be a Lindahl equilibrium for the economy with redistributed
endowments.
5.5. Uninformed Government: Endowment Declarations
The second version of our main result applies to the case of an uninformed Govern-
ment: a Government that does not know the agents' endowments.
We augment the basic scheme described in Section 5.1 with a vector of endowment
declarations. In the same spirit as Postlewaite and Wettstein (1989) we ask each agent
to declare his endowment, but with the restriction that he cannot declare more than
his true endowment.15 The interpretation of this restriction is that overstatement of
an agent's endowment is physically impossible. The Government can ask the agent
to put his money on the table and hence verify if he really has as much as is being
declared. On the other hand agents can hide their endowments (report an endowment
below their true one) and keep the hidden part for their own consumption.
The scheme that we describe below, in essence, is the same as the one described
in Section 5.4, but in which the feasible set F is dened on the basis of declared
endowments rather than the true ones (which the Government does not observe).
In addition, a redistributive prize (penalty) is given to those agents that declare an
endowment higher (lower) than the average declared endowment. It turns out that
this is sucient to give all agents the corrective incentives in their declaration of
endowments.
To describe our new augmented scheme formally we need to introduce some further
notation at this point. We will denote by ^ !h agent h's declaration of his endowment,
while ^ W will denote the array f^ !1; :::; ^ !Hg. As we mentioned above, we take each
15Postlewaite and Wettstein (1989) are concerned with the implementation of the (constrained)
Walrasian correspondence, not with an economy with public goods. On the issue of the manipulation
of endowments in the implementation of arbitrary social choice correspondences see also Hurwicz,
Maskin, and Postlewaite (1995).Efficient Provision of Public Goods 17
agent's endowment declaration to satisfy ^ !h 2 (0;!h].16 We also let ! be the average
endowment declaration across agents so that ! = (
PH
h=1 ^ !h)=H.
As we discussed informally above, the agents' endowment declarations trigger an
amount of redistribution which is a function of the deviation of each declaration from
the average declared endowment !. Let
~ !
h = ^ !
h +
1
H
(^ !
h   !) (10)
In deciding whether the outcome of the scheme is feasible or not, the Government
takes the endowment declarations at face value, and of course takes into account
the redistribution that they induce. Therefore, we can re-write the set of feasible
allocations of Section 5.4 as follows. Let ^ R =
PH
h=1 ^ !h and, given  and ^ W, dene
the set FW(; ^ W) to be as follows
(
(^ T; ^ B) 2 A j ^ R >
H X
h=1
^ T
h  0 and ~ !
h  
H X
i=1
^ b
i
h   
h
H X
i=1
^ T
i  0 8h
)
(11)
Analogously to Section 5.4, whenever ^ T and ^ B are not in the set F(; ^ W), we
proceed to zero out the agents declarations entirely. In this case, as before, we set
the consumption of each agent to be equal to his (true) endowment !h, and G to be
equal to 0.
Whenever the declarations (^ T; ^ B; ^ W) are such that (^ T; ^ B) 2 F(; ^ W), the scheme
allocates consumption of private and public to each agent as follows. The amount of
public good G is exactly as before, and therefore is given by (6). In addition, each
agent gets to consume any part of his endowment of private good that was hidden by
his declaration of ^ !h. Therefore, taking into account the redistribution term yielded
by (10), the allocation of private consumption is given by,
c
h = !
h + ~ !
h   ^ !
h   
hG   B
h (12)
Given a  and an array (^ T; ^ B; ^ W), let CW(; ^ T; ^ B; ^ W) = (CW1(; ^ T; ^ B; ^ W);:::;
16Notice that we are excluding the possibility that ^ !h = 0. This can be interpreted as an assump-
tion stipulating that the Government knows that no agent has an endowment of zero.Efficient Provision of Public Goods 18
CWH(; ^ T; ^ B; ^ W);G) be the allocation yielded by setting private consumption as in
(12) and G as in (6).
We are now ready to complete the formal description of our augmented schemed.
For each h, let ~ Ah = Ah  (0;!h], and set ~ A =
H

h=1
~ Ah. Next, consider the following
outcome map OW that, for any given , associates an allocation C to every possible
array of declarations (^ T; ^ B; ^ W) 2 ~ A.
O
W(; ^ T; ^ B; ^ W) =
8
<
:
CW(; ^ T; ^ B) if (^ T; ^ B; ^ W) 2 F(; ^ W)
C0 otherwise
(13)
Throughout the rest of the paper, for every h 2 H, we denote by OWh(; ^ T; ^ B; ^ W)
the private and public good consumption for individual h in the allocation OW(; ^ T;
^ B; ^ W).
This gives us all the ingredients to describe formally our second augmented scheme.
Remark 4: Given a  2 H 1 consider an augmented scheme dened as follows.
For every array of declarations (^ T; ^ B; ^ W) 2 ~ A, the resulting allocation is given by
OW(; ^ T; ^ B; ^ W).
The augmented scheme which we have just described, yields a well dened H-
player strategic-form game which we will denote by  W(). The strategy set of each
player h in  W() is ~ Ah. Player h's payo given any strategy prole in ~ A is given by
his utility from consumption of private and public good Uh[OWh(; ^ T; ^ B; ^ W)].
For the remainder of the paper, for a given  W(), by the set of Nash equilib-
rium outcomes of  W() we mean the set of private consumption and public good
allocations that result from any Nash equilibrium of the strategic-form game.
We are now ready to state formally our second main result.
Theorem 2: Let any vector of tax loadings  2 b H 1 and ! be given. Assume that
 is individually rational according to Denition 4.
Then the set of Nash equilibrium outcomes of  W() is (;!).Efficient Provision of Public Goods 19
The intuition behind Theorem 2 is closely related to the one we outlined for
Theorem 1. The main dierence is that, here, the agents have the correct incentives
to reveal their true endowments because of the redistribution terms yielded by (10).
In equilibrium, this part of the redistribution of endowments is combined with the
redistribution terms given by the declarations ^ B so that, relative to our previous
augmented scheme, its net eect on the equilibrium allocation is in fact zero.
5.6. Uninformed Government: Veto Power
The third and last version of our main result also applies to the case of an uninformed
Government that does not know the agents' endowments. This time, instead of asking
the agents to declare their endowments as in Section 5.5, we give each of the agents
the possibility to veto the proposed allocation.
The third version of our main result holds under mildly more stringent conditions
than Theorems 1 and 2. These are embodied in Assumptions 6 and 7 below. We
believe that this version of our main result is worth pursuing for two main reasons.
First of all, by contrast to Theorem 2 above, in our next theorem the Government does
not need to be able to verify the maximum value of any of the agents' endowments.
Secondly, we believe that showing that our main result still holds when each agent
is given the option to veto the proposed allocation is interesting in its own right.
Theorem 3 below highlights the fact that in our model the agents can be considered
free to opt out of the system entirely, and consume their endowment of private good
ignoring the rest of the agents in the economy. Of course in equilibrium this will not
be the case.
To state the third version of our main result, we need to extend the agents's utility
functions to be dened for all possible values of consumption of private and public
good. We simply assume that negative values of the consumption of either good
yield utilities which are no better than the utility yielded by the consumption of any
feasible bundle.
Assumption 6: For each h = 1;:::;H, U
h is dened as follows. For each h let Uh
be a real number satisfying
U
h  inf
ch0;G0
U
h(c
h;G) (14)Efficient Provision of Public Goods 20
We then set
U
h(c
h;G) =
8
<
:
Uh(ch;G) if ch  0 and G  0
Uh otherwise
(15)
Before we are able to state our next theorem, we also need to strengthen Assump-
tion 5 above by adding the following boundary condition to the utility function of
each agent.17
Assumption 7: The utility function of every individual h satises the following prop-
erty: for every positive private consumption level ch > 0 there exists an  > 0 such
that Uh(ch   ;) > Uh(ch;0).
The second way in which we augment the basic scheme embodied in (3), (4), (5)
and (6) is designed to make the `minmax' utility of each agent to be the level of utility
that he would get by opting out of the system, not consuming any public good, and
simply keeping his endowment of private good. We believe this to be an appealing
feature of our next result.
Intuitively, we want to give to any agent that receives a negative transfer the
possibility to veto the proposed allocation. If one or more agents veto the proposed
allocation the augmented scheme yields the allocation C0.
Some extra notation is needed at this point. For each h, let b Ah = Ah  f0;1g,
with generic element (^ T h;^ bh;vh), and set b A =
H

h=1
b A. Agent's h declaration of (^ T h;^ bh)
together with a `vh = 1' is interpreted as agent h putting a veto on the proposed
allocation. Conversely, a declaration of `vh = 0' is interpreted as h not putting a veto
on the proposed allocation. Recall that only the veto votes of those agents whose
endowments are being reduced by the redistribution declarations ^ B are considered
eective. Any agent can set vh = 1 at any time, but this will have an eect on the
outcome of the game only if ^ B is such that Bh > 0.
17Notice that Assumption 7 in fact implies one side of Assumption 5 above. In particular, it is
clear that it implies that in every Pareto-ecient allocation we must have that G > 0. We have
chosen to state it as an additional condition purely for the sake of simplicity.Efficient Provision of Public Goods 21
Let V = f0;1gH, with generic element v. Lastly, given any ^ B, let V( ^ B)  H be
the subset of agents for which Bh > 0. We can now dene the outcome function OV
for our augmented scheme with veto power. Let
F
V =
n
(^ T; ^ B;v) 2 b A j h 2 V( ^ B) ) v
h = 0
o
(16)
and
O
V(; ^ T; ^ B;v) =
8
<
:
C(; ^ T; ^ B) if (^ T; ^ B;v) 2 FV
C0 otherwise
(17)
Throughout the rest of the paper, for every h 2 H, we denote by OV h(; ^ T; ^ B;v) the
private and public good consumption for individual h in the allocation OV(; ^ T; ^ B;v).
This gives us all the ingredients to describe formally our next augmented scheme.
Remark 5: Given a  2 H 1 consider an augmented scheme dened as follows.
For every array of declarations (^ T; ^ B;v) 2 b A, the resulting allocation is given by
OV(; ^ T; ^ B;v). Player h's payo corresponding to any vector (cH;G) 2 IR
2 is given
by U
h(ch;G), dened as in Assumption 6.
The augmented scheme which we have just described, yields a well dened H-
player strategic-form game which we will denote by  V(). The strategy set of each
player h in  V() is b Ah. Player h's payo given any strategy prole in b A is given by
his utility from consumption of private and public good U
h[OV h(; ^ T; ^ B;v)].
For the remainder of the paper, for a given  V(), by the set of Nash equilibrium
outcomes of  V() we mean the set of private consumption and public good allocations
that result from any Nash equilibrium of the strategic-form game.
We can now state our third main result.
Theorem 3: Let Assumptions 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 hold.
Let any vector of tax loadings  2 b H 1 and ! be given, and assume that  is
individually rational according to Denition 4.
Then the set of Nash equilibrium outcomes of  V() is (;!).Efficient Provision of Public Goods 22
The intuition behind Theorem 3 is very close to the one behind Theorem 1. The
main dierence is connected to the need to assume that preferences satisfy Assump-
tion 7 in addition to what we previously maintained. In particular, we need to show
that any equilibrium of  V() will not involve an (eective) veto from the part of any
agent. As for theorem 1, we rely on the fact that (unless Bh = 0 for every h) for
some h it will have to be the case that Bh < 0. Notice that this particular agent can
always make sure that the amount of redistribution of endowments in the economy
is precisely zero, thus neutralizing the eect of any veto from the part of any agent.
However, we also need to show that he will have an actual incentive to do so whenever
an allocation has been eectively vetoed by some agent in the economy. Assumption
7 guarantees that this will in fact be the case. Agent h can simply zero out the re-
distribution of endowments in the economy, and then set the amount of public good
equal to some (small)  > 0 making himself better o.
Once we know that no eective veto will take place in any Nash equilibrium of
 V() the result can be established using an argument that follows the same lines as
we described for the proof of Theorem 1 above.
APPENDIX
A.1. Lindahl Equilibria
We begin by proving Propositions 1 and 2. Of course the proof of Proposition 1, which is equivalent
to the First and Second Welfare Theorems for Lindahl equilibria, runs along well known standard
lines. We report it here for the sake of completeness only. For the sake of clarity, it is convenient to
break up the argument into several distinct Lemmas.
Lemma A.1: Every Lindahl equilibrium allocation is Pareto-ecient. In other words, L  P.
Proof: Let  be a Lindahl equilibrium and C = (c1;:::; cH; G) be the associated Lindahl equilibrium
allocation. Let ^ T be the associated vector of tax declarations such that ^ Th = ^ Th(h;!h; ^ T h) for
every h.
Suppose by way of contradiction that C is not Pareto-ecient. By strict monotonicity of pref-
erences (Assumption 2) this implies that there exists an allocation C that is feasible and such that
Uh(ch;G) > Uh(ch;G) for every h. We now want to show that this implies that
ch + hG > ch + hG 8h = 1;:::;H (A.1)Efficient Provision of Public Goods 23
Given the constraints in (1) it is obvious that, for each h, the fact that Uh(ch;G) > Uh(ch;G)
implies that either ch + G > R, or ch + hG > !h must hold. If the former is the case for any
h, then clearly C cannot be a feasible allocation. Therefore, we conclude that (A.1) must hold.
Consider now summing the inequalities (A.1) over h. Using
PH
h=1 h = 1 we obtain that
G +
H X
h=1
ch > G +
H X
h=1
ch (A.2)
Finally, using strict monotonicity of preferences, we know that G +
PH
h=1 ch = R. Therefore,
(A.2) above implies that C is not feasible. This contradiction is clearly enough to prove the claim.
Proof of Remark 1: The claim is rather obvious given Proposition 2. Indeed it is enough to
notice that for every ! >> 0, the given property of Uh(;) is enough to guarantee that in any
Lindahl equilibrium allocation we must have that ch > 0 for every h and G > 0.
Lemma A.2: Let G = (c1;:::;cH;G1;:::;GH) denote a generic element of IR
2H, and consider the
following set.
F =
(
G 2 IR
2H j max
h2H
Gh +
H X
h=1
ch  R
)
(A.3)
Let also Q  F be dened as follows: G 2 Q i there does not exist a b G 2 F such that Uh(^ ch; b Gh)
 U(ch;Gh) for all h, and Uh(^ ch; b Gh) > U(ch;Gh) for some h.
Then, if G 2 Q it must be the case that (i) Gh = maxi2H Gi for every h, and (ii) maxh2H Gh
+
PH
h 1 ch = R.
Proof: Claim (ii) is immediate by monotonicity of preferences.
To establish (i) we proceed by contradiction. Without loss of generality, assume that GH <
maxh2H Gh. Consider next the array G dened as follows. Let ch = ch and Gh = Gh for all
h = 1;:::;H  1. Set also cH = cH, and GH = maxh2H Gh > GH. Clearly, using (A.3), we have
that G 2 F. Moreover, using the monotonicity of preferences, the utility of H is higher with G than
with G. Since the utility of all other agents is the same with G and with G, this contradicts the
fact that G 2 Q. This is sucient to prove the claim.
Lemma A.3: Let any G 2 Q be given and consider the set
P(G) =

G 2 IR
2H j Uh(ch;GH)  Uh(ch;Gh) 8h
	
(A.4)
Then the sets F and P(G) are both closed and convex. Moreover, F \ P(G) = G.Efficient Provision of Public Goods 24
Proof: The fact that both F and P(G) are closed and convex is a direct result of (A.3) and (A.4)
together with Assumption 2 (continuity), and we omit the details.
To complete the proof, we proceed by contradiction. Assume that there exists some G 6= G
such that G 2 F \ P(G). Let b G = G + (1   )G with  2 (0;1). Since F is convex it must be
the case that b G 2 F. Since preferences are strictly quasi-concave (Assumption 2), G 6= G and G
2 P(G) we have that Uh(^ ch; b Gh)  Uh(ch;Gh) for every h, and Uh(^ ch; b Gh) > Uh(ch;Gh) for
some h. However, the latter inequalities contradict the fact that G 2 Q. This clearly enough to
conclude the proof.
Lemma A.4: Let any G 2 Q, P(G) and F be given as in Lemma A.3. Then there exists a vector
 = (0;:::;H) with h > 0 for every h = 0; :::;H, such that
(i) 0
hPH
h=1
 
ch   chi
+
PH
h=1 h  
Gh   Gh
> 0 8 G 2 P(G)=F
(ii) 0
hPH
h=1
 
ch   chi
+
PH
h=1 h  
Gh   Gh
 0 8 G 2 F=P(G)
(A.5)
Proof: The fact that a vector  satisfying (A.5) exists is a direct consequence of Lemma A.3 and
of the separating hyperplane theorem.
To show that  >> 0 we proceed by contradiction. Suppose rst that 0  0. Consider G dened
as ch = ch + with  > 0 for every h, and Gh = Gh for every h. Clearly G 2 P(G)=F. However,
since 0  0 we have that
0
"
H X
h=1
 
ch   ch
#
+
H X
h=1
h  
Gh   Gh
= 0H  0 (A.6)
which contradicts (i) of (A.5).
Next, suppose that h  0 for some h  1, and consider G dened as ch = ch for every h, Gi
= Gi for every i 6= h and Gh = Gh +  with  > 0. Clearly, G 2 P(G)=F. However, since h  0
we have that
0
"
H X
h=1
 
ch   ch
#
+
H X
h=1
h  
Gh   Gh
= h  0 (A.7)
which contradicts (ii) of (A.5). This is clearly enough to conclude the proof of the claim.
Lemma A.5: Let any G 2 Q, P(G) and F be given as in Lemma A.3, and let  >> 0 be the
corresponding separating hyperplane yielded by Lemma A.4. Dene
 =
 
1=0;:::;H=0 
(A.8)
Then,
PH
h=1 h = 1Efficient Provision of Public Goods 25
Proof: We proceed by contradiction. Suppose rst that
PH
h=1 h > 1, and consider G dened as
ch = 0 for every h and Gh = R for every h. Clearly, G 2 F=P(G). Recall now that, by Lemma
A.2 we have that Gh = maxi2H Gi for every h. Moreover, by Assumption 5, we must clearly have
that maxh2H Gh < R. Therefore
H X
h=1
 
ch   ch
+
H X
h=1
h  
Gh   Gh
=
 
H X
h=1
h   1
!
R   max
h2H
Gh

> 0 (A.9)
However, using (A.8), (A.9) clearly contradicts (ii) of (A.5).
Suppose next that
PH
h=1 h < 1, and consider G dened as ch = R=H for every h and Gh
= 0 for every h. Clearly, G 2 F=P(G). Recall also that, by Assumption 5, we must have that
maxh2H Gh > 0. Therefore, using Lemma A.2 again, we get
H X
h=1
 
ch   ch
+
H X
h=1
h  
Gh   Gh
= max
h2H
Gh
 
1  
H X
h=1
h
!
> 0 (A.10)
However, using (A.8), (A.10) clearly contradicts (ii) of (A.5). Therefore, the proof of the lemma is
complete.
Lemma A.6: Let any G 2 Q, P(G) and F be given as in Lemma A.3, and let  >> 0 be the
corresponding vector of weights yielded by Lemma A.8. Let also !h = ch + hG. Then, for every
h 2 H, the pair (ch;Gh) solves the following problem.
max
ch;Gh Uh(ch;Gh)
s:t: ch + hGh  !h
Gh  0; ch  0
(A.11)
Proof: We proceed by contradiction. Suppose, without loss of generality, that the statement is false
for h = H. Let the solution to problem (A.11) when h = H be denoted by (cH0;GH0) 6= (cH;GH).
Evidently, we must have that
UH(cH0;GH0) > UH(cH;GH) (A.12)
Consider now b G 2 IR
2H dened as (^ ch; b Gh) = (ch;Gh) for every h  H   1, and (^ cH; b GH) =
(cH0;GH0). Notice that using (A.12) have that b G 2 P(G). Since b G 6= G, using Lemma A.3, we can
now conclude that b G 2 P(G)=F. However, since, by assumption (^ cH; b GH) is feasible in problem
(A.11), and by construction ch + hGh = !h, we now have that
H X
h=1
 
ch   ch
+
H X
h=1
h  
Gh   Gh
= ^ cH + H b GH   cH   HGH  0 (A.13)Efficient Provision of Public Goods 26
Since b G 2 P(G)=F, (A.13) directly contradicts (i) of (A.5). Therefore, the proof of the lemma is
now complete.
Lemma A.7: Every Pareto-ecient allocation is a Lindahl equilibrium allocation for some redistri-
bution of initial endowments. In other words, P  L.
Proof: Let any Pareto-ecient allocation b C = (^ c1;:::;^ cH; b G) 2 P be given. Consider now G
dened as ch = ^ ch and Gh = b G for every h. Clearly, since b C 2 P, it must be the case that G 2
Q, where Q is as in Lemma A.2. Let  be the vector of weights associated with G yielded by (A.8),
and set !h = ch + hGh for every h.
Next, let ^ Th = b G=H for every h. Using Lemma A.6 it is now immediate to check that setting
Th = ^ Th and ch = ch for every h yields a solution to Problem (1) for  =  and ! = !.
Therefore, it is clear from Denition 2 that setting the vector of endowments ! as above yields
a Lindahl equilibrium with prices  =  and a corresponding Lindahl equilibrium allocation equal
to b C. This is clearly enough to prove the claim.
Proof of Proposition 1: The claim is a direct consequence of Lemma A.1 and Lemma A.7.
A.2. The Proof of Proposition 2
Let any  2 b H 1 be given, and dene Let 
(R) = f! 2 RH
+ such that
PH
h=1 !h = Rg, a nonempty,
convex and compact set. Let f be a map 
(R) ! RH, with the h-th component of f dened as
fh(!) = !h + h
"
H X
i=1
iGi(i;!i)   Gh(h;!h)
#
(A.14)
where, for every h, Gh(h;!h) is given by the solution to Problem (1). Clearly, f(!) is continuous
by Assumption 2 and by inspection of Problem 1.
Notice next that (A.14) immediately implies that
PH
i=h fh(!) = R for every ! 2 
(R). More-
over, (A.14) trivially implies that fh(!)  0 for every h and for every ! 2 
(R). Therefore, f(!)
is a continuous map from 
(R) into 
(R). Therefore, f has a xed point ! = f(!).
Now set G =
PH
i=1 iGi(i;!i). Using the denition (A.14) of the map f(), and the fact that
h > 0 for every h it is now immediate to see that we then get
Gh(h;!h) = G 8h (A.15)
From (A.15) it is now clear that if we set ^ Th = G=H and !h = !h for every h, we get that the
solution to Problem (1) satises ^ Th = ^ Th(h;!h; ^ T h) for every h. Therefore, there only remains
to show that at the xed point of f() we obtain !h > 0 as required by the statement of the
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Notice that, using an argument virtually identical to the proof of Lemma A.1, and the properties
of the xed point we have just shown to be true, it is possible to show that the allocation C =
(!1   1G;:::; !H   HG; G) is in fact Pareto-ecient. (To avoid repetition, we omit the
details of this claim.) Suppose now, by way of contradiction, that for some h we have that !h
= 0. From (A.14) it is immediate that this would imply that G = 0. However, by Assumption
5 this implies that C cannot be Pareto-ecient, contrary to what we have already shown. This
contradiction is enough to prove that we must have that !h > 0 for every h, and therefore the proof
is now complete .
A.3. Feasible Allocations Under the Scheme
Proof of Remark 2: It is clearly sucient to show that for every  2 IR
H such that
H X
h=1
h = 0 (A.16)
there exists a solution to the following system of 3H linear equations in the H2 unknowns ^ B.
H X
i=1
^ bi
1 = 1
H X
i=1
^ bi
2 = 2 :::
H X
i=1
bi
H = H
^ b1
1 = 0 ^ b2
2 = 0 ::: ^ bH
H = 0
H X
i=1
^ b1
i = 0
H X
i=1
^ b2
i = 0 :::
H X
i=1
bH
i = 0
(A.17)
Since we are assuming throughout that H  3 (Assumption 1), it is obvious that the system (A.17)
has at least as many unknowns as it has equations.18
It is also easy to see that the system (A.17) must have a solution ^ B. This can be checked
directly, for instance, by setting ^ B as follows. For every 1  h  H   2 set ^ b
h+1
h = h + H,
^ bH
1 =  H and ^ b
j
h = 0 for every j other than j = h + 1 and j = H. Also set ^ b1
H 1 = H 1 +
H, ^ bH
H 1 =  H and ^ b
j
H 1 = 0 for every j other than j = 1 and j = H. Moreover, set ^ b1
H =
 H 1   H, as well as ^ b
j
H =  j   H, and nally ^ bH
H =  (H   1)H. It is immediate to
verify that these values solve (A.17) for every  2 IR
H that satises (A.16).
A.4. The Proof of Theorem 1
We begin with several Lemmas, leading up to the proof of Theorem 1.
18It is worth remarking that our assumption that H  3 does real work here. It is easy to check
that when H = 2, the system (A.17) in fact has a solution only when 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Lemma A.8: Let any  2 H be given and consider the strategic-form game  () described in
Remark 3. Let any array (^ T; ^ B) with minh2H Bh < 0 and (^ T; ^ B) 62 F() as dened in (8) be given.
Then (^ T; ^ B) cannot be a Nash equilibrium of  ().
Proof: We proceed by contradiction. Assume, without loss of generality that (^ T; ^ B) 62 F() is a
Nash equilibrium of  () and that BH < 0. We want to show that H can unilaterally deviate and
increase his utility.
Recall that the utility of H corresponding to (^ T; ^ B) is
UH(!H;0) (A.18)
Now consider H deviating from playing (^ TH;^ bH) to playing (^ TH;^ bH), with the latter dened
as follows.
^ TH =  
H 1 X
h=1
^ Th (A.19)
and
^ bH
h =

H   1
 
H 1 X
i=1
^ bi
h 8h = 1;:::;H   1 (A.20)
and
^ bH
H =     
H 1 X
h=1
^ bh
H (A.21)
with  > 0 satisfying   (H   1)!h for every h = 1;:::;H   1.
Notice that using (2) we immediately know that
PH
h=1^ bH
h = 0 as required. Moreover, since
BH < 0 by assumption, we also know that ^ bH  0 as required. Plugging (A.19), (A.20) and (A.21)
into (3), (4), (5) and (6), we obtain that, after H's deviation to (^ TH;^ bH) the outcome of the game
is as follows. Every h = 1;:::;H   1 consumes ch = !h   =(H   1) of private good and G = 0
public good, while H's consumption is given by cH = !H + of private good and G = 0 public good.
Therefore, after the deviation H's utility is given by
UH(!H + ;0) (A.22)
By Assumption 2 (monotonicity), the quantity in (A.22) is strictly greater than the quantity in
(A.18). Therefore what we have described is a protable deviation for H, and this clearly suces
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Lemma A.9: Let any  2 H be given and consider the strategic-form game  () described in
Remark 3. Let any array (^ T; ^ B) with minh2H Bh = 0 and (^ T; ^ B) 62 F() as dened in (8) be given.
Then (^ T; ^ B) cannot be a Nash equilibrium of  ().
Proof: Notice rst that, using (2) it is immediate that if minh2H Bh = 0 then Bh = 0 for every h
= 1;:::;H.
The rest of the argument is by contradiction. Assume that an array(^ T; ^ B) as in the statement
of the Lemma is indeed a Nash equilibrium of  (). Recall that since (^ T; ^ B) 62 F(), the utility of
every h corresponding to (^ T; ^ B) is given by Uh(!h;0).
Since (^ T; ^ B) is a Nash equilibrium of  (), of course it must be the case that no h has a
protable unilateral deviation starting from (^ T; ^ B). However, by inspection of problem (1), this
implies that ^ Th(h;!h;0;:::;0) = 0 for every h 2 H. Therefore  is a Lindahl equilibrium for E(!)
with corresponding Lindahl equilibrium allocation C = (!1;::: !H;0) = C0. By Proposition 1 this
in turn implies that C0 is Pareto-ecient. Since by Assumption 5 we know that C0 62 P this is a
contradiction, and hence the proof of the claim is now complete.
Lemma A.10: Let any  2 H be given and consider the strategic-form game  () described in
Remark 3. Then any array of declarations (^ T; ^ B) which constitutes a Nash equilibrium point of  ()
must have the property that (^ T; ^ B) 2 F() as dened in (8).
Proof: Since by (2) it must be the case that
PH
h=1 Bh = 0, the claim is a direct consequence of
Lemma A.8 and Lemma A.9.
Lemma A.11: Let a vector of individually rational tax loadings  2 b H 1 and an allocation C
2 (;!) be given. Then C is a Nash equilibrium outcome of  ().
Proof: By Proposition 2 we know that for some (redistributed) endowment vector ! 2 
(), 
is a Lindahl equilibrium of E(!) with corresponding equilibrium allocation C. By Remark 2 we
know that for some ^ B satisfying (2) and ^ bh
h = 0 for every h, we have that
!h = !h   Bh 8h = 1;:::;H (A.23)
Consider now an array (^ T; ^ B) with ^ B as required for (A.23) to hold and ^ Th = G=H for every
h. Observe that the outcome associated with (^ T; ^ B) in  () is precisely C. To see that (^ T; ^ B)
is an equilibrium of  () we proceed as follows.
Notice rst of all that since  is a Lindahl equilibrium of E(!), if we set !h = !h and ^ T h
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setting ^ Th = ^ Th and ch = ch. Therefore, the highest possible utility that h can achieve in  (),
given (^ T h; ^ B h), is
max

Uh(!h;0); Uh(ch;G)
	
(A.24)
Since C 2 (;!) is individually rational the maximum in (A.24) is equal to Uh(ch;G). It now
follows directly that h's payo in  (), given (^ T h; ^ B h) is maximized by setting ^ Th = ^ Th and
ch = ch. This is clearly enough to prove the claim.
Lemma A.12: Let !h,  and an array (^ T h; ^ B h) be given. Assume that !h and ^ B h are such
that !h = !h  
P
i6=h^ bi
h  0.
Let also a pair (ch;Gh) that is feasible in Problem (1), given ^ T h and when h's endowment is
set equal to !h = !h  
P
i6=h^ bi
h, be given. Then there exists a pair (^ Th;^ bh) such that (i) the array
(^ Th; ^ T h;^ bh; ^ B h) is in F(), where F() is dened as in (8), and (ii) Oh(; ^ T; ^ B) = (ch;Gh).
Proof: By inspection of the constraint in Problem (1) and of the denition of F() it is enough to
prove the claim for any pair (ch;Gh) that is on the boundary of the feasible set in Problem (1). We
divide the rest of the argument into two parts, dealing with two separate possible cases.
The rst case we consider is the one in which h, !h and R are such that for every pair
(ch;Gh) such that ch + hGh  !h it is also the case that ch + Gh  R. Notice that in this case
the boundary of the feasible set in Problem (1) consists entirely of pairs (ch;Gh) such that ch +
hGh = !h. Next, let any pair (ch;Gh) satisfying the last equality be given. We now construct the
corresponding (^ Th;^ bh) as follows. Let
^ Th = Gh  
X
i6=h
^ Ti (A.25)
set ^ bh
h = 0, and for every i 6= h let
^ bh
i = !i  
X
j6=h
^ b
j
i   (R   !h)
i
X
j6=h
j (A.26)
Notice that since
P
h2H !h = R, taking sums over i 6= h and using (2 immediately gives
P
i2H^ bh
i
= 0. Therefore ^ bh satises (2) as required.
Our next step is to check that the array (^ Th; ^ T h;^ bh; ^ B h) is in F() when ^ Th is as in (A.25),
^ bh
h = 0 and ^ bh
i is as in (A.26) for every i 6= h. Using (A.25) and (A.26) it is enough to check that,
for every i 6= h we have that
iGh  (R   !h)
i
X
j6=h
j (A.27)Efficient Provision of Public Goods 31
Using the fact that
P
h2H h = 1, it is immediate to see that (A.27) is equivalent to
!h   hGh  R   Gh (A.28)
Notice now that since we are assuming that ch + hGh = !h, the left-hand side of (A.28) is clearly
equal to ch. Since, by assumption, (ch;Gh) is feasible in Problem (1), the right-hand side of (A.28)
must be greater or equal to ch. Therefore (A.28) must be veried. This is clearly sucient to show
that, in this case (^ Th; ^ T h;^ bh; ^ B h) is in F(). Using (A.25) and ^ bh
h = 0, it is now obvious that
Oh(; ^ T; ^ B) = (ch;Gh). This clearly suces to prove our claim in the rst case.
The second case we consider is the one in which some pairs (ch;Gh) on the boundary of the
feasible set of Problem (1) are such that ch + Gh = R and ch + hGh < !h. (Evidently, this is
only possible when hR < !h). In this case, for those points on the boundary of the feasible set
of Problem (1) that satisfy ch + hGh = !h our claim can be proved exactly as in the rst case,
and we do not repeat the argument here. Therefore, there only remains to prove our claim for those
pairs on the boundary of the feasible set of Problem (1) that satisfy ch + Gh = R and ch + hGh
< !h. Let any such pair be given. We now construct the corresponding (^ Th;^ bh) as follows. Let ^ Th
be as in (A.25), and set
^ bh
h = !h   R + Gh(1   h)  
X
i6=h
^ bi
h (A.29)
Notice that since ch + Gh = R and ch + hGh < !h, this implies that ^ bh
h  0, as required. For
every i 6= h set
^ bh
i = !i  
X
j6=h
^ b
j
i   Gh(1   h)
i
X
j6=h
j (A.30)
Our next step is to check that the array (^ Th; ^ T h;^ bh; ^ B h) is in F() in this case. Using (A.25),
(A.29) and (A.30) it is enough to check that, for every i 6= h we have that
iGh  Gh(1   h)
i
X
j6=h
j (A.31)
However, using the fact that
P
h2H h = 1, it is immediate that (A.31) must always be true. This is
clearly sucient to show that, in this case (^ Th; ^ T h;^ bh; ^ B h) is in F(). Using (A.25), and (A.29)
it is now obvious that O(; ^ T; ^ B) = (ch;Gh) as required. Therefore, this is enough to conclude the
proof of the claim.
Lemma A.13: Let a vector of individually rational tax loadings  2 b H 1. Let an allocation C
62 (;!) be given. Then C is not a Nash equilibrium outcome of  ().Efficient Provision of Public Goods 32
Proof: Since the minmax payo of each player in  () is Uh(!h;0) if C is not an individually
rational allocation the claim is trivial and we omit the details.
Suppose next that C is an individually rational allocation that is a Nash equilibrium outcome
of  (), and let (^ T; ^ B) be the corresponding equilibrium strategy prole. Recall that, by Lemma
A.10 we know that (^ T; ^ B) 2 F(). For each h, let !h = !h  
P
i6=h^ bi
h , and ! = (!1;:::;!H).
Since (^ T; ^ B) 2 F(), using Lemma A.12 it is now immediate that since (^ T; ^ B) is a Nash
equilibrium of  () we must have that ^ Th(h;!h; ^ T h) = ^ Th for every h. Therefore  is a Lindahl
equilibrium for E(!) with corresponding Lindahl equilibrium allocation C. Therefore C 2 (;!).
This is clearly enough to prove the claim.
Proof of Theorem 1: The claim is a direct consequence of Lemma A.11 and Lemma A.13.
A.5. The Proof of Theorem 2
The proof of Theorem 2 also begins with several Lemmas which are then used to prove the main
result.
Lemma A.14: Let any  2 H be given and consider the strategic-form game  W() described in
Remark 4. Let any array (^ T; ^ B; ^ W) with minh2H[(^ !h   !)=H]   Bh < 0 and (^ T; ^ B) 62 FW(; ^ W)
as dened in (11) be given. Then (^ T; ^ B; ^ W) cannot be a Nash equilibrium of  W().
Proof: A minor adaptation of the proof of Lemma A.8 above is sucient to prove the claim. In
particular, H's deviation must now be computed taking into account the overall transfers to each
agent h which now total [(^ !h  !)=H]   Bh, rather than  Bh as before. The rest of the details are
omitted for the sake of brevity.
Lemma A.15: Let any  2 H be given and consider the strategic-form game  W() described in
Remark 4. Let any array (^ T; ^ B; ^ W) with minh2H[(^ !h   !)=H]   Bh = 0 and (^ T; ^ B) 62 FW(; ^ W)
as dened in (11) be given. Then (^ T; ^ B; ^ W) cannot be a Nash equilibrium of  W().
Proof: Notice rst of all that minh2H[(^ !h   !)=H]   Bh = 0 implies that
^ !h   !
H
  Bh = 0 8h = 1;:::;H (A.32)
Notice also that, using (10) and (A.32), together with the fact that we restrict ^ !h to be greater that
0, clearly implies that in this case we must have that ~ !h   Bh = ^ !h > 0.
Consider now the maximization problem (1) for every individual h. Our rst step is to notice
that, for the given h and actual endowment !h it must be that Gh(h;!h) > 0 for at least one h.Efficient Provision of Public Goods 33
To see why this must be the case suppose, by way of contradiction, that Gh(h;!h) = 0 for every h.
Then  must be a Lindahl equilibrium for E(!) with corresponding Lindahl equilibrium allocation
C0. Therefore, by Proposition 1, C0 would have to be a Pareto-ecient allocation, which directly
contradicts Assumption 5.
The rest of the argument is also by contradiction. Therefore suppose that (^ T; ^ B; ^ W) with
[(^ !h   !)=H]   Bh = 0 for every h, and (^ T; ^ B) 62 FW(; ^ W) is a Nash Equilibrium of  W(). We
then want to show that at least one agent has a protable unilateral deviation available.
Using our rst step, without loss of generality up to a re-labeling of agents, assume that
GH(H;!H) > 0. From the strict quasi-concavity of UH it now follows that
UH 
(!H;0) + (1   )

cH(H;!H);GH(H;!H)
	
> UH(!H;0) 8[0;1) (A.33)
Recall that, as we observed above, ~ !h   Bh = ^ !h > 0 for every h. Therefore it is immediate
that there exists a  < 1 such that
(1   )h GH(H;!H)  ~ !h   Bh 8    8 h = 1;:::;H (A.34)
Now consider H deviating from playing (^ TH;^ bH; ^ !H) to playing (^ TH;^ bH; ^ !H), with the latter
dened as follows.
^ TH =  
H 1 X
h=1
^ Th + (1   )GH(H;!H) (A.35)
with  2 (;1), while ^ bH = ^ bH and ^ !H = ^ !H. Plugging (^ TH;^ bH; ^ !H) into (3), (4), (5) and (6)
we now obtain that after H's deviation the outcome of the game gives H a utility of
UH 
(!H;0) + (1   )

cH(H;!H);GH(H;!H)
	
(A.36)
Since before the deviation H utility was UH(!H;0), (A.33) is now sucient to show that this is a
protable deviation for H. This is clearly enough to conclude the proof of the Lemma.
Lemma A.16: Let any  2 H be given and consider the strategic-form game  W() described in
Remark 4. Then any array of declarations (^ T; ^ B; ^ W) that constitutes a Nash equilibrium point of
 W() must have the property that (^ T; ^ B) 2 FW(; ^ W) as dened in (11).
Proof: Since by (2) it must be the case that
PH
h=1 Bh = 0, the claim is a direct consequence of
Lemma A.14 and Lemma A.15.Efficient Provision of Public Goods 34
Lemma A.17: Let  be given and consider  W(). Let also any (^ T; ^ B; ^ W) that constitutes a Nash
equilibrium of  W() be given. Moreover, assume that, in this equilibrium, for some j 2 H we have
that
~ !j   j
H X
h=1
^ Th   Bj > 0 (A.37)
then it must be the case that
^ !h = !h 8h 6= j (A.38)
Proof: Without loss of generality, up to a re-labeling of agents, assume that
~ !1   1
H X
h=1
^ Th   B1 > 0 (A.39)
By way of contradiction (without loss of generality again) assume also that
^ !H < !H (A.40)
Consider now the following deviation by H, from playing (^ TH;^ bH; ^ !H) to playing (^ TH;^ bH; ^ !H),
with the latter dened as follows.
^ TH = ^ TH (A.41)
and
^ !H = ^ !H +  (A.42)
with  > 0, and
bH
i = bH
i  
1
H2  8i = 1;:::;H   1 (A.43)
and
bH
1 = bH
1 and bH
H = bH
H (A.44)
Plugging (A.41), (A.42), (A.43) and (A.44) into (3), (4), (5) and (6) immediately shows that when-
ever
 <
H
H   1
"
~ !1   1
H X
h=1
^ Th   B1
#
(A.45)Efficient Provision of Public Goods 35
then it must be the case that

^ T H; ^ TH; ^ B H;^ bH

2 FW

; ^ W H; ^ !H

(A.46)
It now follows that, using (A.41), (A.42), (A.43), and (A.44) together with (12), after H's
deviation his consumption of private good has increased by [(H   1)=H], while the amount of
public good provided in the economy has not changed. This is clearly sucient to show that this is
a protable deviation for H, and hence concludes the proof of the Lemma.
Lemma A.18: Let  be given and consider  W(). Let also any (^ T; ^ B; ^ W) that constitutes a Nash
equilibrium of  W() be given. Moreover, assume that, in this equilibrium
~ !j   j
H X
h=1
^ Th   Bj > 0 (A.47)
for at least two distinct agents. Then it must be the case that
^ !h = !h 8h = 1;:::;H (A.48)
Proof: The claim is an immediate consequence of Lemma A.17.
Lemma A.19: Let  be given and consider  W(). Let also any (^ T; ^ B; ^ W) that constitutes a Nash
equilibrium of  W() be given. Moreover, assume that, in this equilibrium, for some j 2 H we have
that
~ !j   j
H X
h=1
^ Th   Bj > 0 (A.49)
while
~ !h   h
H X
i=1
^ Ti   Bh = 0 8h 6= j (A.50)
Then there exists a (^ T; ^ B; ^ W) that also constitutes a Nash equilibrium of  W() and such that
OWh(^ T; ^ B; ^ W) = OWh(^ T; ^ B; ^ W) 8h = 1;:::;H (A.51)
and
^ !h = !h 8h = 1;:::;H (A.52)Efficient Provision of Public Goods 36
Proof: By Lemma A.17 it is immediate that
^ !h = !h 8h 6= j (A.53)
We now construct the new Nash equilibrium as in the statement of the Lemma as follows. Set
(^ Th;^ bh; ^ !h) = (^ Th;^ bh;!h) 8h 6= j (A.54)
and
^ Tj = ^ Tj (A.55)
and
^ !j = !j (A.56)
while
^ b
j
h =
1
H2(!j   ^ !j) 8h 6= j (A.57)
and
^ b
j
j =
H   1
H2 (!j   ^ !j) (A.58)
Using (A.54), (A.55), (A.56), (A.57) and (A.58) together with (3), (4), (5) and (6) it is now
immediate to check that
OWh(^ T; ^ B; ^ W) = OWh(^ T; ^ B; ^ W) 8h = 1;:::;H (A.59)
as required. Moreover, in the new proposed equilibrium the maximization problem faced by agent j
clearly has not changed. Therefore j's new strategy must be a best response to the strategies of all
other agents in (^ T; ^ B; ^ W).
Using (A.50) and (A.53) it is also straightforward to check that, for every agent h 6= j, after j's
change of strategy the opportunity set in terms of ch and G has in fact not changed. This, using
(A.59), is clearly enough to show that (^ T; ^ B; ^ W) must be a Nash equilibrium of  W(). This
concludes the proof of the Lemma.
Lemma A.20: Let  be given and consider  W(). Let also any (^ T; ^ B; ^ W) that constitutes a Nash
equilibrium of  W() be given.
Then there exists a (^ T; ^ B; ^ W) that also constitutes a Nash equilibrium of  W(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that
OWh(^ T; ^ B; ^ W) = OWh(^ T; ^ B; ^ W) 8h = 1;:::;H (A.60)
and
^ !h = !h 8h = 1;:::;H (A.61)
Proof: Recall that by Lemma A.16 we know that any Nash equilibrium of  W() must satisfy
(^ Th; ^ Bh; ^ Wh) 2 FW(; ^ W). Therefore, using (10) and (11), we know that
~ !h   h
H X
i=1
^ Ti   Bh  0 8h = 1;:::;H (A.62)
and
~ !j   h
H X
h=1
^ Th   Bj > 0 (A.63)
for at least one agent j. Therefore the Lemma is a direct consequence of Lemma A.17 and Lemma
A.18.
Proof of Theorem 2: From Lemma A.20, we know that there is no loss of generality in restricting
attention to Nash equilibria of  W() with the property that ^ !h = !h for every h = 1;:::;H.
The rest of the proof is therefore a minor adaptation of the argument that we used to prove
Theorem 1 (see Lemma A.11, Lemma A.12 and Lemma A.13). The details are omitted for the sake
of brevity.
A.6. The Proof of Theorem 3
As before, we use several preliminary Lemmas to lead up to the proof of Theorem 3.
Lemma A.21: Consider the strategic-form game  V () described in Remark 5 and let Assumptions
1 through to 7 hold. Then any array of declarations (^ T; ^ B;v) that constitutes a Nash equilibrium
point of  V () must have the property that (^ T; ^ B;v) 2 FV () as dened in (16).
Proof: Let (^ T; ^ B;v) be a Nash equilibrium of  V (). Without loss of generality assume that BH
= minh2H bh.
Notice next that if BH = 0, then, since
P
h2H Bh = 0, we must have that Bh = 0 for every h
and therefore it must be the case that V( ^ B) = ;. It follows that in this case we already know that
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The rest of the argument is by contradiction. Assume then that some (^ T; ^ B;v) 62 FV () with
BH < 0 is a Nash equilibrium of  V (). We now want to show that H has a protable unilateral
deviation available.
Recall that H's utility corresponding to the Nash equilibrium strategy prole (^ T; ^ B;v) is
UH(!H;0) (A.64)
Now consider H deviating from playing (^ TH;^ bH;vH) to playing (^ TH;^ bH;vH) with the latter
dened as follows.
vH = 0 (A.65)
and
^ TH =  
H 1 X
h=1
^ Th +  (A.66)
with  > 0, and
^ bH
h =  
H 1 X
i=1
^ bi
h 8h = 1;:::;H (A.67)
Notice that using (2) we immediately know that
PH
h=1^ bH
h = 0 as required. Moreover, since BH
< 0 by assumption, we also know that ^ bH  0 as required. Plugging (A.66) and (A.67) into (3), (4),
(5) and (6), we obtain that, after H's deviation to (^ TH;^ bH) it must be that Bh = 0 for every h
so that we immediately know that V( ^ BH; ^ B H) = ; and therefore that (^ TH; ^ T H; ^ BH; ^ B H)
2 FV ().
Moreover, the outcome of the game after H's deviation to (^ TH; ^ BH) is as follows. Every
h = 1;:::;H consumes ch = !h   h of private good and G =  public of good. Therefore, after
the deviation the utility of H is given by
UH(!H   H;) (A.68)
By Assumption 7, for some  > 0, the quantity in (A.68) is greater than the quantity in (A.64).
Therefore, for the appropriate  > 0, (^ TH;^ bH) is a protable unilateral deviation for H from the
proposed equilibrium. This is clearly enough to conclude the proof of the claim.
Lemma A.22: Consider the strategic-form game  V () described in Remark 5 and let Assumptions
1 trough to 7 hold. Then any array of declarations (^ T; ^ B;v) that constitutes a Nash equilibrium
point of  V () must have the property that (^ T; ^ B;v) 2 F() where F() is dened as in (8).Efficient Provision of Public Goods 39
Proof: We start by showing that in any Nash equilibrium (^ T; ^ B) of  V () we must have that the
utility of each agent h must be at least
Uh(!h;0) (A.69)
Notice that for any h 2 V( ^ B) it is immediate that (A.69) must hold since given the action of
the others, any h 2 V( ^ B) can unilaterally deviate to set vh = 1, and hence achieve utility Uh(!h;0).
Consider now any h 62 V( ^ B). If for some i 2 V( ^ B) we have that vi = 1, then the utility of h
is clearly equal to Uh(!h;0). If vi = 0 for every i 2 V( ^ B), notice that h can always unilaterally
deviate to setting ^ Th =  
P
i6=h ^ Ti. Clearly in this way he can guarantee utility Uh(!h   Bh;0).
Since h 62 V( ^ B) we know that Bh < 0 in this case. Therefore Uh(!h   Bh;0) > Uh(!h;0). Hence,
the equilibrium utility of any agent must be at least Uh(!h;0).
Observe now that, by Assumption 2 (monotonicity), we have that for every h
Uh(!h;0) > Uh(0;0)  Uh (A.70)
where Uh is dened as in (14).
Lastly notice that, since by Lemma A.21 we know that any equilibrium (^ T; ^ B) must satisfy (^ T; ^ B)
2 FV (), it is immediate that if (^ T; ^ B) 62 F() then for some h we must have that Uh(OV h(^ T; ^ B))
= Uh. This clearly contradicts the fact that the utility of every agent in any Nash equilibrium must
be at least Uh(!h;0). Therefore the proof of the claim is complete.
Lemma A.23: Let a vector of individually rational tax loadings  2 b H 1 be given, and let As-
sumptions 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 and 7 hold. Let an allocation C 2 (;!) be given. Then C is a Nash
equilibrium outcome of  ().
The argument is virtually identical to the proof of Lemma A.11. All that needs to be added is that
no agent will want deviate to set vh = 1 since C is individually rational according to Denition 1.
The rest of the details are omitted.
Lemma A.24: Let a vector of individually rational tax loadings  2 H 1, and let Assumptions 1,
2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 hold. Let an allocation C 62 (;!) be given. Then C is not a Nash equilibrium
outcome of  ().
Since by Lemma A.22 we know that any Nash equilibrium of  V () must be in F(), the claim can
be proved using an argument that is identical to the proof of Lemma A.13. The rest of the details
are omitted.Efficient Provision of Public Goods 40
Proof of Theorem 3: The claim is a direct consequence of Lemma A.23 and Lemma A.24.
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